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Kwass: Priorities Between Successive Assignments of the Same Right

STUDENT NOTES
PRIORITms BETWEEN SuccEssIvE ASSIGNmENTS OF THE SAME
RiGHT.-There are two prevailing views in the United States upon
the question of which assignee should take, when an assignor makes
successive assignments of the same right.'
One view following the English rule as set forth in the case
of Dearle v. Hall,2 is that the first assignee to give notice to the
obligor will prevail. Though this view is conceded to be followed
by the majority of the American cases,3 the United States Supreme
Court, in Salem Trust Company v. Manufacturer'sFinance Company,' has declared itself in favor of the other view. The rule
there applied is that where an assignment is held to vest only
equitable title in the assignee the prior assignment, being the prior
equity, would prevail, without regard to notice given to the
debtor.5
This latter view has been adopted by the American Law Institute's kestatement of Contracts, G though in the actual number of
decided cases it is the majority view; the Reporter stating that in
view of the Salem Trust Company Case he did not expect further
acceptance of the present majority rule.7
The first West Virginia case to deal with successive assignments
in any way was Bank of the Valley v. Gettinger. In that case
the chose in action was assigned, and subsequently an attachment
was issued at the suit of the creditor of the assignor against the
obligor, after the assignment, but before the obligor had notice
thereof. The Court held that the debt passed to the assignee at
the time of the assignment, and gave the assignee priority over
the subsequently attaching creditor, though neither the obligor nor
the creditor (of the assignor), had notice9 of the assignment at the
time the creditor sought to attach.
Though this case might be more properly classified under situations in which the assignee prevails over subsequently attaching
creditors of the assignor,1 0 in many respects that situation is
analogous to the present one.
Clarke v. Hogeman," which actually presents a question of
successive assignments, held that the assignor, by the assignment,
'WLISTON,

CONTRACTS, 826.

23 Russell 1.

3 31 A. L. R. 880 and 66 L. R. A. 775.
4264 U. S. 182, 68 L. ed. 628, 44 Sup. Ct. 266 (1923).
5 See also 1 W3LLISTON, op. cit., p. 826.
$RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 173.
7 Appendix to the Restatement, explanation of § 173.
83 W. Va. 309, 316 (1869).
9 Italics ours.
10 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS,
11 13 W. Va. 718, 729 (1878).
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passed equitable title to the assignee, leaving the assignor with no
control over it, and that therefore the subsequent assignee would
get no right. The Court further states that if both assignments
were valid, the equities being equal, the first in point of time would
prevail ;12 nor would the Court give any weight to the claim of
the second assignee that he did not have notice of the first assignment.13
In Tingle v. Fisher,!A the Court again followed these principles,
holding no notice of the assignment to the obligor was necessary
to give validity to the first assignment; but that if the obligor paid
the second assignee without knowledge of the first assignment, he
would be discharged of liability to the first assignee. This last bit
of dictum is in accord with the view expressed in the Restatement,
which states that if the second assignee procures payment from
the obligor, he will be entitled to retain it."
Turk v. Skhies,'8 in point three of the syllabus states that "the
first assignee of a chose in action has preference." However the
case limits this very broad statement by confining it to cases when
the first assignee is a bona fide purchaser for value; thus presenting an analogous situation to those in Clarke v. Hogeman, and
Tingle v. Fisher.
Judging from the rules laid down in the cases so far discussed,
it would seem that the West Virginia Court had determined its
stand upon priority of successive assignments. However the
case of State v. Coda,'7 should be considered. In that case Coda
and Nash had built a road under contract -with the State Road
Commission. A bond was executed by the contractors and a surety
company for the faithful performance of the contract and the
payment of laborers and materialmen. The action was brought to
determine which of certain creditors of the contractors were entitled to share in the $4,011.06 which was due from the Commission, the claim to which the contractors had assigned in parts to
these creditors in payment of their claims.
In the surety contract the contractors had assigned to the surety
company any sums that might become due from the Commission
to protect it against liability on the bond to pay laborers and
materialmen. Subsequent assignments were made to appellant,
Riley, a general creditor, and to materialmen. Riley claimed
priority over the surety company on the ground that the Commis12 S upra, p. 730.
is See also Thomas v. Linn, 40 W. Va. 122, 20 S. E. 878 (1894).
1420 W. Va. 497, 510 (1892).
15 Supra, n. 6.
1645 W. Va. 82, 85, 30 S. E. 234 (1898.)
17 103 W. Va. 676, 138 S. E. 234 (1927).
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sion was never notified of the assignment to the surety company
and for the further reason that he had a superior equity, since
he had loaned to the contractors in order that they might pay off
laborers. The court did not pass upon the priorities between
Riley and the surety company, but rested the case upon the priority
of the materialmen with respect to Riley, although their assignments
were subsequent to Riley's. The case seems to turn on the peculiarities of the particular situation, and the policy in favor of protecting materialmen. The fact that Riley's money was used to
pay laborers seems to have been neglected, and he was treated as
an ordinary general creditor. It seems that the court took the view
that something in the nature of an equitable lien on the claim
against the Commission arose by operation of law in favor of the
materialmen prior to any assignment to them and this gave them
priority over the assignee, Riley. It would seem that this case
does not weaken the general rule favoring the prior assignee.
In view of these facts, it .would seem that, until further adjudication upon the point, the West Virginia rule can be understood
to be in accord with the minority view.
-SMNEY J. KWASS.

WLs-TESTAmENTARY

INTENT.-Proceedings to probate as the

will of T, a letter to his brother written and signed by T. The
letter was to the effect, "If I should fail to pull through this
operation I want you to sell the Columbia Carbon Stock * * * *
and divide the proceeds equally among my brothers and sisters
* * * *". T died two days after the operation. The Circuit
Court found this to be T's will and ordered it probated. Objected
that the letter did not show Animus testandi. Held, animus
testandi is the purpose to direct the posthumous disposition of
property. It is not essential to this purpose that the testator
should intend to make a will or know that he has performed a
testamentary act. The letter written by T showed this intent.
Langfitt v. Langfitt, 151 S. E. 715 (W. Va. 1930).
A holographic will is good under our statute, ch. 77, 33. It is
not necessary that the decedent should know that he has performed
a testamentary act, nor that he should intend to perform such
an act. Rice v. Freeland, 131 Va. 298, 109 S. B. 186. No particular words are necessary to show testamentary intent. In re
Major's Estate, 264 Pac. 542. One may act anino testandi
without knowing that he is making a will, if he manifests clear
intent to dispose of his property after his decease and observes
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